The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs.
Non Technical Summary
The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude.
Although competition authorities' attitude towards vertical restraints varies substantially across countries, price restrictions are often treated less favorably than non-price restrictions such as exclusive territories, selective distribution, etc. While there are some variations according to the nature of the price restriction, Resale Price Maintenance (RP M ) is for example generally viewed as per se illegal or, at the very least, as most probably undesirable.
This consensus against RP M contrasts with the economic analysis of vertical restraints, which shows that both price and non-price vertical restrictions may either improve or harm economic efficiency -and often provide alternative ways to achieve the same objective. Furthermore, most of the arguments made by the courts to justify their tolerant attitude towards non-price restrictions would apply as well to RP M . There is, however, one argument made in practice against RP M , which is that it could facilitate horizontal agreements.
The present paper explores this argument in more detail and starts from the idea that, under RP M , retail prices are centrally set by the manufacturer and thus do not fully adjust to local variations on retail costs or demand; as a result, retail prices are more uniform under RP M , and deviations from a tacit agreement are thus more easily detected; it follows that RP M , while being less efficient since it generates less flexible prices, can be adopted to facilitate interbrand collusion.
In our model, long-lived producers sell to short-sighted retailers. In each period, each producer signs an exclusive contract with a retailer. Demand is stochastic, and retailers receive private information on their demand after contracting but before the good is delivered to the market. Retail prices, but not wholesale prices, are observable by competitors. We derive the most profitable collusive equilibrium in two cases: in the first case, vertical contracts are restricted to franchise contracts while in the second case, producers can moreover control the retail price (RP M ). When RP M is banned, retail prices react to retailers' information, which makes it harder to detect a deviation from collusive behavior. By eliminating retailers' pricing discretion, RP M facilitates the detection of such deviations. On the other hand, RP M rigidifies retail prices and, ceteris paribus, reduces profits; it thereby raises the short-run incentives to deviate. We characterize the situations where RP M effectively increases collusive equilibrium profits.
We also show that, when collusion is a serious concern, RP M reduces welfare whenever it allows firms to increase their profits. The key point is that while price rigidity facilitates the detection of a deviation for a collusive agreement, it reduces the profitability of the collusive outcome. Thus, colluding firms will impose RP M only when the increase in the collusive price is high enough to compensate them from the negative impact on profits. This effect is strong enough to offset the potential welfare benefits that RP M may generate. As a result welfare is reduced when RP M is allowed. This result is reinforced by the fact that RP M may also increase the ability of firms to punish a participant after a deviation.
We also compare RP M with alternative vertical restraints and show that, compared with non-price restrictions, RP M provides firms with a better instrument to detect deviations from collusion.
Introduction
Although competition authorities' attitude towards vertical restraints varies substantially across countries, price restrictions are often treated less favorably than non-price restrictions such as exclusive territories, selective distribution, etc. While there are some variations according to the nature of the price restriction (advertised or recommended prices, price floors, price ceilings, etc.), Resale Price Maintenance (RPM, whereby retail prices are set by manufacturers rather than by distributors) is for example generally viewed as per se illegal or, at the very least, as most probably undesirable.
1
This consensus against RPM contrasts with the economic analysis of vertical restraints, which shows that both price and non-price vertical restrictions may either improve or harm economic efficiency -and often provide alternative ways to achieve the same objective. Furthermore, most of the arguments made by the courts to justify their tolerant attitude towards non-price restrictions would apply as well to RPM. For example, in GTE Sylvania, the US Supreme Court mainly gives two arguments to abandon the per se illegality of exclusive territories: a) non-price vertical restraints improve the efficiency of supply; b) non-price restrictions stimulate interbrand competition, while price restrictions are more likely to reduce it. It is interesting to review those two lines of arguments in the light of the economic literature on RPM and exclusive territories.
• Efficient supply of goods and services
The Supreme Court summarized its argument as follows: "Established manufacturers can use [vertical restrictions] to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free-rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if none did".
2
This argument applies to RPM as well: by eliminating intrabrand competition on prices and guaranteeing a minimal retail margin, RPM actually 1 In France, for example, price floors are per se illegal under article 34 of the 1986 Ordinance; RPM (including price ceilings) can also constitute a restriction of competition under article 7 as well as an abuse of economic dependance under article 8 of the same Ordinance. For a broad overview of the attitude towards price and non-price restrictions, see OECD (1994) .
2 433 U.S. (1977) at 55.
stimulates intrabrand competition for services and induce distributors to supply better retail services. 3 Furthermore, both price and non-price restrictions may improve efficiency but also raise profits at the expense of consumer surplus and total welfare.
4
• Impact on interbrand competition
The Supreme Court also mentioned the "redeeming virtues" of vertical restrictions on interbrand competition:
"Vertical restrictions promote inter-brand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers. For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumers".
5
Economic analysis indeed suggests that vertical restraints may encourage entry and thus promote interbrand competition, e.g. by allowing greater efficiency.
6 But there again, the argument is not limited to non-price verti-cal restrictions: price restrictions, too, can increase the profitability of the relationship between manufacturers and distributors. There is also an abundant literature on the adverse impact of vertical restraints on interbrand competition. Many effects rely on the idea of strategic delegation, where manufacturers give more freedom to their retailers in order to commit themselves to respond more "appropriately" to their rivals' pricing strategies; in that respect, RPM goes the wrong way since it reduces the retailers' freedom of action. In contrast, granting exclusive territories gives more freedom to retailers, and can thus be used strategically by producers to reduce interbrand as well as intrabrand competition.
7 Vertical restraints can also be used to deter entry of potentially more efficient rivals.
8 But there again, the type of restraints that can serve strategic purposes are not price restrictions but exclusivity restrictions or restrictions that give more freedom to the distributors in the choice of retail prices. For example, assigning exclusive territories makes retailers more aggressive in the case of entry and might thus be used to deter local entry, which would instead be encouraged if RPM limited incumbent retailers' ability to respond.
Overall, the economic analysis thus does not appear to call for a less tolerant attitude towards price restrictions 9 (the last line of argument even suggests instead to be less permissive towards non-price restrictions). There is, however, one last argument made in practice against RPM, which is that it could facilitate horizontal agreements. For example, in Business Electronics, the Supreme Court repeated its previous statement to justify the per se illegality of RPM:
"Our opinion in GTE Sylvania noted a significant distinction between vertical non-price and vertical price restraints. That is, there was support for the proposition that vertical price restraints reduce inter-brand price competition because they "facilitate cartelizing".... The authorities cited by the Court suggested how vertical price agreements might assist horizontal price fixing at the manufacturer level (by reducing the manufacturer's incentive to cheat on a cartel, since its retailers could not pass on lower prices to con-7 See for example Rey-Stiglitz (1988 , 1995 . This argument has recently been empirically tested by Slade (1998) in the context of a change of regulation in the UK beer industry.
8 For example, long-term exclusive dealing contracts can raise entry barriers -see Aghion-Bolton (1987) and Hart-Tirole (1990) . For a review of the literature on market foreclosure, see Rey-Tirole (1996) . Comanor-Rey (1998) shows how well-established distributors can block the entry of more efficient rivals and discusses in this light the recent action of the Federal Trade Commission against TOY R'US.
9 The Supreme Court later recognized this issue in Business Electronics, where it mentions the difficulty of defining a clear dividing line between per se illegal price restraints and non-price vertical restraints to be judged under the rule of reason, given that both affected retail prices. See 485 U. S. 717 (1988) at 727-728. sumers) or might be used to organize cartels at the retailer level. Similar support for the cartel-facilitating effect of vertical non-price restraints was and remains lacking".
10
The Court's argument that "vertical price agreements" can facilitate collusion by reducing the incentive of a manufacturer to cheat on a cartel by lowering wholesale price has not been formalized and seems to rely on the assumption that the manufacturer can undertake not to modify the retail price set by the distributor -e.g., the contract makes the renegotiation of retail prices more difficult or costly than that of wholesale prices.
11
The present paper explores this argument in more detail and starts from the idea that, under RPM, retail prices are centrally set by the manufacturer and thus do not fully adjust to local variations on retail costs or demand; as a result, retail prices are more uniform under RPM, and deviations from a tacit agreement are thus more easily detected; it follows that RPM, while being less efficient since it generates less flexible prices, can be adopted to facilitate interbrand collusion.
12
In our model, long-lived producers sell to short-sighted retailers. In each period, each producer signs an exclusive contract with a retailer. Demand is stochastic, and retailers receive private information on their demand after contracting but before the good is delivered to the market. Retail prices, but not wholesale prices, are observable by competitors. We derive the most profitable collusive equilibrium in two cases: in the first case, vertical contracts are restricted to franchise contracts while in the second case, producers can moreover control the retail price (RPM). When RPM is banned, retail prices react to retailers' information, which makes it harder to detect a deviation from collusive behavior. By eliminating retailers' pricing discretion, RPM facilitates the detection of such deviations. On the other hand, RPM rigidifies retail prices and, ceteris paribus, reduces profits; it thereby raises the short-run incentives to deviate. We characterize the situations where RPM effectively increases collusive equilibrium profits and identify conditions under which RPM reduces welfare whenever it allows firms to increase their profits.
10 485 U.S. 717 (1988) at 725-6. The argument that RPM reduces competition and efficiency when it serves merely to sustain a retail cartel is well-known, but exclusive territories would achieve the same aim.
11 A manufacturer could otherwise "cheat" on the cartel agreement by modifying both the retail price and the wholesale price at the same time -RPM might actually make such deviation more appealing, by ensuring that the cut in wholesale price is not partially appropriated by retailers.
12 Rey and Vergé (1999) analyze this issue from a different perspective and show that, when producers distribute their goods through the same competing distributors, RPM can eliminate any scope for effective competition even in the absence of repeated interaction.
While the role of the information transmitted through the observed market outcomes is well-known since Green-Porter (1984) and Abreu-PearceStachetti (1986) , to our knowledge this is the first attempt to analyze price restrictions as facilitating practices for collusion along these lines. The closest related work is the recent analysis of price rigidity by Athey-BagwellSancharico (1998) , who analyze the collusive equilibria under Bertrand competition between firms having private information on their cost.
13 Their model involves no vertical relationship but incomplete information. They focus on patient firms and thus rely on a folk theorem; in this context, the main issue is incentive compatibility on the equilibrium path: since costs are private information, a firm can pretend it has a low cost and adopt the corresponding equilibrium price. It is shown that for sufficiently high discount factors the best collusive equilibrium may involve a constant price, with no revelation of the costs. Our result is different in several respects. In their model, price variability is created by producers adjusting to their cost, while in our model it is due to distributors' behavior. The reduced form of the game played by producers in our model is similar to a collusion game with noisy observations in which RP M allows to reduce the noise. Second, we do not rely on folk theorems: 14 in our model sufficiently patient firms would actually achieve cartel profits without using RPM. One can thus view the two arguments as complementary explanations of the effect of price rigidity on collusion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic model, where producers distribute their goods through retailers who face local shocks on the demand, and defines useful benchmarks (competitive and monopoly prices). Section 3 analyses the scope for collusion in this setup, with and without RP M ; the following two sections then focus on two ways in which RP M can facilitate collusion: it can help detecting deviations from the collusive agreement (section 4) and it can also allow the firms to sustain harsher punishments when deviations are detected (section 5). Section 6 draws the policy implications. Section 7 shows that the analysis is robust to alternative assumptions on the nature of local shocks (retail cost uncertainty versus demand uncertainty), while section 8 briefly discusses how it would extend to the case where the type of contract (RP M or not) is itself not observed by rivals. Lastly, section 9 compares RP M with alternative vertical restraints and shows that RP M is generally in better position to help firms to detect deviations from a collusive path.
The basic model
Two manufacturers, 1 and 2, produce differentiated goods with stochastic demand
where p i is the retail price of manufacturer i's good and the demand shocks ε 1 and ε 2 are independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [−ε,ε] . Production and retail costs are normalized to 0, and manufacturers face a fixed cost k. Manufacturers have an infinite life-time horizon and the same discount factor δ. In each period, each manufacturer contracts with one retailer that lives only for one period (alternatively, manufacturers can only commit to spot distribution contracts). All parties are risk neutral and have a zero reservation utility level.
The stage game
At the contracting stage, the shocks ε 1 and ε 2 are unknown to all parties and manufacturers have all the bargaining power. Then, ε i is observed by retailer i but not by the manufacturers nor the other retailer.
We shall contrast two situations: in the absence of RP M , each manufacturer i offers a franchise contract, consisting of a franchise fee A i and a wholesale price w i ; under RP M , it can moreover set the retail price p i .
15 Retail prices are publicly observed, whereas franchise fees and wholesale prices are not. For simplicity, we will however assume that the nature of contract (RP M or not) signed by one manufacturer is observed by its competitor at the end of the period -it may indeed be much easier for a competitor to observe the nature of a contract than its precise terms. We discuss in section 8 the case where the nature of the contract is not observed.
The timing of the stage game is thus as follows: -first, each manufacturer i secretly offers a contract, of the form (A i , w i ) or (A i , w i , p i ), to a retailer, who accepts it or not; -second, each retailer i observes ε i and, if it has accepted the contract, sets the retail price p i (at the level chosen by the manufacturer under RP M ); -third, demands and profits are realized; each manufacturer further observes the retail prices and the nature of the contract signed by its competitor.
Benchmarks: Static equilibrium and collusion
Suppose that the above game is played only once, and consider first the case where manufacturers are restricted to franchise contracts. If retailer i accepts the contract (A i , w i ) then, denoting by p e j the expected value of the rival's retail price, retailer i will set its own retail price to (using the linearity of the profit function with respect to the rival's price, and the independence of the distribution of the two demand shocks)
Denoting by p e i the expected retail price of this retailer, (1) can be rewritten as
where
Therefore, given the expected retail price for the rival good, p e j , by setting the wholesale price w i at the appropriate level manufacturer i can perfectly control the expected price of its own product, p e i , but cannot control the flexibility of this price, which always "half responds" to the shock ε i . For the sake of presentation, whenever there is no ambiguity we will say that the manufacturer "chooses the expected retail price p e i " rather than the wholesale price w i . Note that the manufacturer can recover the retailer's profit through the franchise fee, so that choosing p e i yields an expected profit given by
denotes the variance of the retail prices. Consider now the Nash equilibrium of this game. Since the contract offered to a retailer is not observed by the rival, it cannot influence the rival's retail price. Therefore, taking as given the expected value p e j of the rival's equilibrium retail price, producer i will choose p e i so as to maximize (4), which is achieved for p e i = d + σp e j /2 by setting w i to zero. This is an illustration of a well-known principle: since the contract does not affect the rival's behavior, it is optimal to "sell the technology" to the retailer by charging a wholesale price equal to marginal cost, here zero; being the residual claimant, the retailer then sets its retail price so as to maximize the aggregate profits of the vertical structure, which the producer can appropriate through the franchise fee.
In equilibrium, both producers set their wholesale price to zero (w 1 = w 2 = 0) and, solving (3), the expected prices p e 1 and p e 2 are therefore given by
each producer's expected Nash equilibrium profit is equal to Π(p N )+v (ε)−k. In what follows we assume that Nash equilibrium profits are non-negative:
Suppose now that the two manufacturers can collude and both jointly determine their franchise contracts and make them publicly observed by both retailers. For given wholesale prices w 1 and w 2 , the retail price equilibrium would still be governed by (1); retail prices would thus still satisfy (2) and (3), and expected retail prices would be determined by wholesale prices:
The manufacturers would therefore choose expected prices p e 1 and p e 2 that maximize
and thus such that
.
The per-producer cartel profit is thus given by Π(p M ) + v (ε) − k. Lastly, suppose that RP M is introduced, so that the retail price is independent of ε i : p i = p e i . The manufacturer can still capture all the expected profit (not only through the franchise fee, but also through the wholesale price, which now has no influence on the retail price) but, since the price does no adjust to the demand shock, this expected profit is now given by
In a static context, the manufacturer would thus never impose RP M on the retailer. In a dynamic context, however, RP M might be profitable if it allows the producer to sustain higher prices. To allow for this possibility, we will assume:
3 Tacit Collusion
Franchise contracts
Each manufacturer i maximizes the expected value of the discounted sum of its profits:
If only franchise contracts can be used, and since it is always optimal for a manufacturer to recover its retailer's profit through the franchise fee, the relevant strategies for manufacturer i, denoted s i , can be summarized by a sequence of functions s it , setting the expected price for period t, p e it , as a function of the history of observed retail prices in the previous periods. In what follows we concentrate on fully symmetric equilibria (FSE) in which, in any subgame, manufacturers use the same continuation strategy: s 1t = s 2t . We denote by Π F the maximal payoff that can be obtained in such equilibrium, and by s F the corresponding strategy. Similarly, we denote by Π F the minimal payoff that can be obtained and by s F the corresponding strategy.
We show in the Appendix that, given the uniformity of the noise distribution, the best collusive strategy consists in sticking to a collusive expected price as long as the realization of the rival's price is consistent with this target, and to "punish" as much as possible any detected deviation; that is, the best collusive strategy is of the form: "agree on an expected price p e ; if the realized retail prices are compatible with this agreement (that is, p i , p j ∈ [p e −ε/2, p e +ε/2]), then stick to p e , otherwise play s F ." If both manufacturers follow this strategy, their expected profit is equal to
If a deviation was always detected with probability 1, no deviation would be profitable if
However, a small deviation (p e i ∈ [p e −ε, p e +ε]) will only be detected with probability |p e − p e i | /ε < 1. The expected gain from such a deviation is thus given by
In particular, a "small" deviation (p e i slightly different from p e ) will not be
The two conditions (5) and (6) are actually necessary and sufficient for the sustainability of collusion, which allows the following characterization of the most profitable collusive strategy, conditional on s F and Π F : s F is of the form: "charge an expected price p F as long as all past retail prices belong to p F −ε/2, p F +ε/2 , and play s F otherwise", where p e = p F maximizes Π(p e ) subject to (5) and (6). See Appendix. In the absence of RP M , the most profitable collusive strategy thus consists in maintaining in each period the same expected price, p F , which can be shown to be equal to min p M ,p F , wherep F is the maximal (expected) price satisfying (5) and (6).
Remark: Multiple locations. While we have focussed here on the case where each manufacturer deals with one retailer, the analysis can be extended to the more realistic situation where manufacturers have retailers in many different locations, provided that the observation of retail prices by the manufacturers is sufficiently costly -if manufacturers could costlessly observe all retail prices, detecting deviations would become easier. For example, the same analysis as above exactly applies when there are several ex ante identical locations with independent shocks on local demands, assuming that in each period manufacturers observe their rival's retail price in only one randomly selected location. 
Resale Price Maintenance
Let us now turn to the case where RP M is allowed. As long as resorting to RP M is observed by the competitor, allowing RP M can only increase the set of equilibria; in particular, the equilibria described above, where manufacturers use franchise contracts and charge p F along the equilibrium path and play s F whenever a deviation if detected for sure, are still equilibria when RP M is allowed but not mandatory: (i) any deviation involving RP M is detected with probability 1 and can thus be punished with the maximal penalty; and (ii) profits from those deviations are lower than those achieved with simple franchise contracts, since RP M makes no use of the retailer's information. The global incentive compatibility condition (5) then ensures that the equilibria resist deviations involving RP M .
We now focus on whether RP M generates new equilibria with higher prices and profits. We denote byΠ the maximal payoff that can be obtained in equilibrium when RP M is allowed and bys the corresponding strategy; similarly, we denote by Π the minimal equilibrium payoff and by s the corresponding strategy. Allowing RP M can facilitate collusion in two ways: it may be used in punishment paths to allow harsher punishments (Π < Π F ) 16 It is optimal to punish "everywhere" a deviation detected in one location. Hence, denoting by ρ il = min
, 1 the probability to detect a deviation to p e il in location l by observing the retail price in that location, the overall gain from a deviation would be of the form
and no-deviation conditions are thus the same as above. Note that observing the quantity bought by each retailer may also give the producer additional information about retail prices. However, this information would be limited if, in addition to local shocks, there was also an independent shock on the demand for each product -see the last section of the Appendix for an elaboration of that point. and on the collusion path to allow an easier detection of deviations (so that we may haveΠ > Π F even if Π = Π F ). However, when RP M is used on the collusion path, deviations become more attractive as they can rely on franchise contracts to use the retailers' information and generate an additional profit v (ε) compared with RP M . The following proposition provides a partial characterization of the most profitable collusive equilibrium in which RPM is used in equilibrium (the proof is omitted; it follows the same steps as for Proposition 3.1 but is simpler, due to the fact that any deviation is detected with probability 1):
The most profitable FSE strategy in which RP M is used along the equilibrium path is of the form: "charge an expected price p RP M as long as all past retail prices are equal to p RP M , and play s otherwise", where p
The most profitable collusive strategy using RPM in equilibrium thus consists again in maintaining in each period the same expected price, p RP M , which can be shown to be equal to min p M ,p RP M , wherep RP M is the maximal price satisfying (7). This condition has a straightforward interpretation: since deviations are detected with probability one and optimally punished in the toughest way, the optimal deviation consists in maximizing current profits (using a franchise contract, hence the term max p π(p, p e ) + v (ε)). The short-run gain from a deviation is thus larger when RP M is used. It has to be compared to the long-run cost of being detected which in turn is, ceteris paribus, reduced by v(ε) when RP M is used (hence the term Π(p e ) − k − Π). Thus using RP M allows to evade from condition (6) (it facilitates detection) but results in a condition that is more stringent than (5) .
We now compare the most profitable equilibria when RP M is available and when it is not. We first focus on the enhanced detection of deviations.
The detection effect
To focus on the ability to detect deviations, we assume away in this section any impact of RP M on the optimal punishments (Π = Π F ).
17 For that 17 This would be the case if the punishment path was restricted to reversal to Nash. [Formally, the analysis of collusion sustained by reversal to Nash is identical to the one presented in this section, setting k = Π(p N ) + v(ε), and reinterpreting Π(p) − k as the difference between profits and static Nash profits.] purpose, we will suppose in this section that the minmax payoff (which is 0 here) can be sustained in equilibrium, even if RP M is not allowed: Π F = 0. This will be the case if the fixed cost is high enough:
See appendix.
If the minmax can be achieved in the absence of RP M , it can a fortiori be sustained when RP M is allowed: Π = Π F = 0 and RP M thus does not affect punishments. RP M can therefore help collusion only if used on the equilibrium path. Whether RP M is indeed used in the most profitable equilibrium then depends on the comparison between the profits with RP M at p RP M , and the profit that can be obtained using franchise contracts on the collusive path. Since Π = Π F , this boils down to a comparison between Π p RP M and Π p F + v (ε).
[From the same arguments as above, the best collusive equilibrium path is stationary and consists of either p
F maximizes Π (p) subject to the global and local incentive conditions (5) and (6) (setting Π F to 0), while p RP M maximizes Π (p) subject to (7) (setting Π to 0), which is clearly more stringent than (5), it follows that RP M can benefit collusion only if p F is limited by the local incentive condition (6), since otherwise p RP M ≤ p F . Furthermore, p RP M must be sufficiently higher than p F to ensure that the increase in expected price outweighs the cost of limiting the retailers' price flexibility. In particular, it must be the case that Π p 
, which supposes that the discount factor is not too small (otherwise, both p F and p RP M will be close to p N ). The following Proposition shows that, if the noise is not too important, there exist a range of discount factors where RP M is indeed part of the most profitable collusive strategy:
If Π = Π F = 0 then, forε/d small enough there exists δ andδ > δ such thats necessarily involves RP M on the equilibrium path for δ < δ <δ.
18
See appendix. Propositions 4 and 4 ensure that the above analysis is meaningful. We show in the Appendix that they are jointly compatible: there is an open 18 The only assumption needed for this result is the fact that δ 1−δ Π − Π increases with δ, which is trivially the case when Π = Π F = 0 but is likely to be true in many if not most other cases. [If Π = Π F , however, the relevant price "p F " is the best price that can be sustained without RP M on the equilibrium path, using Π (and thus, possibly, RP M ) for punishment.] range of parameters (ε, d, k, δ) for which Π F = 0 but the most profitable collusive strategys uses RP M in equilibrium; in that range of parameters, allowing RP M does not enhance the punishments that can be used to deter deviations but leads to an increase of the most profitable collusive price.
The effect on punishment
We now turn to the effect of RP M on punishments. As pointed out above, when adopting RP M is observed by the rival manufacturer, the equilibria derived in the absence of RP M still constitute equilibria when RP M is allowed; therefore, the optimal punishment can only decrease when RP M is allowed Π ≤ Π F . Furthermore, whenever Π < Π F and p F < p M , allowing RP M raises the most profitable equilibrium price -even if RP M is not used on the equilibrium path-since it relaxes both the local and global incentive compatibility. The following proposition establishes that this is indeed the case when there is not too much noise:
Forε/d small enough, there exists k and δ such that Π F > 0 = Π. See appendix. Another case of interest is when a "no-dumping" condition is imposed on the wholesale tariff, that is, when the wholesale price cannot be set below the marginal cost (normalized here to zero):
Then, since the static Nash equilibrium is precisely obtained for wholesale prices equal to marginal cost, in the absence of RP M no equilibrium price can be lower than p N and thus the static Nash equilibrium constitutes the less profitable equilibrium:
In contrast, RP M opens the possibility to impose retail prices in 0, p N , at least for some period of time, and it is easy to show that it is possible to sustain a profit (at least slightly) lower than Π(p N ) + v (ε) − k; 19 allowing RP M therefore raises the most profitable collusive price even though it may not be used on the equilibrium path.
Welfare analysis
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of allowing RP M , assuming that manufacturers coordinate on the best collusive F SE.
If RP M is banned, producers coordinate on the price p F . If the only effect of RP M is to reduce the punishment profit (Π < Π F buts does not use RP M along the equilibrium path), allowing RP M simply increases the expected price and thus is detrimental. When RP M is used in equilibrium, its impact is a priori more ambiguous, since consumers prefer prices that do not react to demand fluctuations.
A measure of welfare is the total surplus W (p 1 , p 2 ; ε 1 , ε 2 ), sum of the consumer surplus, denoted S (p 1 , p 2 ; ε 1 , ε 2 ), and total profit. Using ∂S/∂p i = −D i and π i = p i D i , we have:
Integrating, the total surplus is given by:
If the two prices have the same expected value p e , the expected total surplus is thus:
Therefore, for a given expected price p e , RP M increases total surplus. However, there is a real conflict between firms' interest and consumer or total welfare: consumers like stable prices whereas firms prefer to let them react to demand conditions. Therefore, while RP M has potentially a positive effect on consumer surplus due to the stabilization of prices, manufacturers will adopt RP M only if it leads to an increase of prices large enough to compensate them. The following proposition shows that this is precisely the case where it harms welfare -and a fortiori consumer surplus-when the scope for collusion is substantial; in that case, banning RP M is socially optimal:
When either p
Since V ar [p i ] = v (ε) under franchise contracts, total welfare decreases when RP M is allowed if
or:
It is immediate that (8) implies (9) if 
Retail cost uncertainty
While we have focused on shocks on the demand side, a similar analysis can be conducted when the shocks affect retail costs. The general point is that retailers' prices tend to respond to variations in both the demand they face and their (marginal) costs. RP M prevents adjustments to such local variations and thus facilitates the detection of deviations in producers' tariffs.
To see that, assume that demand is not stochastic, D i (p i , p j ) = d−p i +σp j , but retail cost is. We normalize the average retail costs to zero so that the retail cost of retailer i is ε i , uniformly distributed on the interval [−ε,ε]. The timing of information is the same as before, in particular contracts are signed before the retailer observes its cost. Given a wholesale price w i the retailer sets a price
It follows that in the absence of RP M the retail price is still of the form The analysis of the equilibrium strategies conducted for the case of demand uncertainty carries over to the case of cost uncertainty; since the set of equilibria depends only on the "reduced" profit function and the relationship between the producers' strategy and the observed retail prices, p i = p e i +ε i /2. Therefore, all the results up to Proposition 7 remain valid for the case where ε i is interpreted as a shock on retailer i's marginal cost.
The main difference concerns welfare effects, as it is socially beneficial to let retail prices react to the shocks on the costs. Using π i = (p i − ε i )D i , the same derivation as before shows that, for a common expected price p e , the expected total surplus is given by:
where C is a constant. Hence, RP M should clearly be banned since it has only negative effects on welfare; it increases the best collusive expected price and moreover prevents prices from adjusting to retail costs: With no demand uncertainty and retail cost uncertainty, allowing RP M can only reduce welfare.
Unobserved contracts
We have assumed so far that the type of contract (franchise or RP M ) was observable to all parties. We now discuss the case of secret contracts. We assume here that Π F = Π = 0, which holds true if k is close to Π(p N ) + v (ε). The fact that contracts are secret does not affect the maximal price p RP M that can be sustained when RP M is used in equilibrium but may affect the most profitable strategy based on franchise contracts, since secretly switching to RP M creates a new possibility of deviation. For example, starting from a franchise contract with p F , a firm can impose RP M and a retail price p between p F −ε/2 and p F : it will lose v (ε) but will not be detected by the rival since the price remains in the admissible range.
The price p F and strategy s F previously characterized still form an equilibrium if
Straightforward computations show that this is possible only if
This is the case ifε is large or δ is small, since in both instances p F is small. The non observability of contracts then does not affect the equilibrium.
If condition (11) is not satisfied, the price p F can no longer be sustained when contracts are secret and RP M is allowed. In this case, allowing RP M has two opposite effects. It reduces the most profitable collusive price based on franchise contracts to a lower pricep F < p F , which increases welfare, but manufacturers may then prefer to resort to RP M and implement p RP M , which, for levels of prices that are not too small, reduces welfare.
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Comparison with other vertical arrangements
Other vertical restraints than RP M may affect the variability of retail prices and, therefore, the scope for collusion; it is thus interesting to compare RP M with those other arrangements in the light of the above analysis.
Intrabrand competition
As a benchmark, consider first the case where manufacturers promote strong intrabrand competition among their retailers. Assuming pure Bertrand competition, retail prices would then respond 100% to changes in retail costs and not at all to changes in demand. Therefore, promoting intrabrand competition does not facilitate the detection of producers' deviations from a collusive path when there are shocks on retail costs. Furthermore, even in the case of demand shocks, promoting intrabrand competition does not facilitate the detection of deviations as effectively as RP M whenever retailers are not perfect competitors (e.g., because of differentiation) or marginal costs are not constant (with decreasing returns to scale, variations in the size of demand would affect retail prices).
Exclusive territories
Granting exclusive territories reduces intrabrand competition and tends to give retailers more freedom in the setting of their prices. Therefore, exclusive territories tend to increase the variability of retail prices in the presence of local shocks on consumer demand. For example, in the linear model, retail prices half respond to changes in the size of demand if retailers are granted exclusive territories, whereas they do not respond at all to such changes if, in each location, there is head-to-head competition between rival retailers. Therefore, exclusive territories tend to make producers' deviations more difficult to detect when there are local shocks on consumer demand.
Retail prices always respond to local shocks on retail costs, however, whether retailers benefit from exclusive territories or not. For example, in the linear model, retail prices half respond to variations in retail (marginal) costs if retailers are granted exclusive territories, whereas they fully respond to such changes if there is perfect intrabrand competition. Therefore, exclusive territories tend to reduce the variability of retail prices, but not to the same extent as RP M , which therefore still facilitates the detection of producers' deviations from a collusive path.
Quotas
Quantity quotas, even in the form of quantity floors or ceilings, contribute to increase the variability of retail prices when there are local shocks on consumer demand. For example, assume that producer i imposes a minimal quota q and a maximal quota q ≥ q in the above linear model (a fixed quota would correspond to the case q = q). Given the rival's expected retail price p e j , retailer i will then set a price p i given by
That is, the retail price only half responds to changes in the demand size d i (dp i /dε i = 1/2) when quotas are not binding, but respond fully to such changes (dp i /dε i = 1) when quotas are binding, which exacerbates their variability (for instance, the introduction of a fixed quota doubles the range of retail prices).
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Nonlinear tariffs
Nonlinear wholesale tariffs might also reduce the variability of retail prices. Of course, nonlinear tariffs may involve transaction costs that reduce their appeal. But retailers' arbitrage, too, limits their effectiveness in reducing retail price variability. To see this in the simplest way, we briefly show here that retailers' arbitrage limits a monopolistic producer's ability to reduce the variability of a retailer's price through nonlinear wholesale tariffs; we show formally in the last section of the Appendix that the insights carry over to the duopoly context analyzed above.
Consider a monopolist producer dealing with n retailers, each of them a local monopolist bearing no retail cost and facing a linear demand D i (ε i , p i ) = d+ε i −p i , where local shocks ε i are independently and identically distributed. The intuition is that if retailers coordinate their supply decisions, the producer cannot hope to control each retailer's individual price but only an "average" price; as a result, the producer cannot prevent individual prices from at least partially responding to demand fluctuations. Furthermore, as the number of retailers increases, the producer will loose more and more control over the distribution of retail prices and, in the limit (for a very large number of retailers), it cannot do better than with simple two-part tariffs.
Assuming that retailers can perfectly coordinate their buying decisions, if the producer offers nonlinear tariffs (t k (q k )) k=1,...,n and retailers want to buy a total quantity Q, they will buy (q k ) k=1,...,n solution to
k q k = Q and then redistribute quantities and share the total payment to the producer, t (Q) ≡ k t k (q k ), so as to ensure that each of them gains from participating in this arbitrage.
22 Therefore, for a given realization of the shocks (ε k ) k=1,..,n , the retailers will choose to sell quantitiesq k solution to
In the case of shocks on retail costs, however, a minimal quota is formally equivalent to a price ceiling whereas a maximal quota is equivalent to a price floor.
22 The precise transfers are not relevant for the present analysis, so long as retailers can reach an agreement and agree on the payment-minimizing allocationq ik . and characterized (assuming an interior solution) by
Adding-up those conditions shows that the total quantityQ ≡ kq k is solution toQ
so that the total quantityQ is a function of the local shocks only through their sum k ε k . Building on this observation, conditions (12) yield
Therefore, even if the producer could design at will the function f (ε) ≡ t Q (ε) , the variance of retail price p 1 , say, would be of the form
This variance is minimized for
This minimal variance increases with the number of retailers n: the aggregate shock k ε k provides less and less information on any particular individual shock ε i when the number of location increases, so that the second term in the above expression decreases when n increases. In the limit (n very large) the aggregate shock provides no information at all on any individual shock; the second term thus disappears (E [ε 1 | k ε k ] = E [ε 1 ] and its variance is zero) and the minimal variance is thus equal to V ar [ε 1 ] /4, which is the variance of retail prices generated by two-part tariffs.
Therefore, as the number of retailers increases, the producer is less and less able to reduce the variability of a retailer's price through nonlinear tariffs. When the number of retailers is large, nonlinear tariffs cannot help reduce a retail price variability, as compared with simple two-part tariffs. Furthermore, even if the number of retailers is limited, nonlinear tariffs improve over two-part tariffs but can never be as efficient as RP M in reducing retail price volatility whenever there are at least two retailers (for n = 2, the above minimal variance is V ar [ε 1 ] /8 > 0). Spence, A. M. (1975) , "Monopoly, Quality and Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, 6:417-429.
A Proof of Proposition 3.1
If the expected price is equal to p e at some point on an equilibrium path, then the following strategy is an equilibrium strategy:
"charge the expected price p e , and then play s F if the realized prices belong to [p e −ε 2 , p e +ε 2 ] 2 , and s F otherwise." Consider an equilibrium and an history along the equilibrium path leading to the expected price p e , and let V (p 1 , p 2 ) be the continuation value of the game at this date, as a function of the realized prices. Then
where Π F ≤ V ≤ Π F . We now show that manufacturers have no incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium described above. Manufacturers' candidate equilibrium payoff is
The payoff of deviating and charging p / ∈ [p e −ε, p e +ε] is instead given by
and is thus smaller than in the original equilibrium; therefore, this deviation is not profitable. The payoff of a deviation to p ∈]p e −ε, p e [ is given by
But, since the distribution of the demand shock is uniform and
Therefore, the payoff generated by a deviation to p ∈]p e −ε, p e [ is again smaller in the new candidate equilibrium then in the original equilibrium, and the deviation is thus not profitable. A similar reasoning holds for p > p e . The set of expected prices p e that can be sustained at some point on an equilibrium path is a closed interval I F , which is the set of prices satisfying both
If the expected price p e is sustained at some point in an equilibrium, then the strategy described in the previous lemma must form a FSE, and thus
Conversely, if this condition is satisfied for a given p e , then the strategy described in the previous lemma indeed form a FSE, in which in the first period the expected price is p e . Therefore an expected price p e can be sustained at some point in a FSE if and only if it satisfies (16).
This condition clearly implies both (14) and (15): (15) is the local version of (16) (for prices p slightly different from p e ) while (14) involves a (weakly) larger probability of detection than (16) and a deviation that is profitable when detected with probability 1 would a fortiori remain profitable for a smaller probability of detection. We now show that, together, (14) and (15) imply (16). Suppose this was not the case. This implies that the optimal deviation involves a price p insufficiently different from p e for being detected with probability 1 (p ∈ [p e −ε, p e +ε]), otherwise (14) would be violated. If for example this price p is below p e , then
But the function that appears in the left-hand side is concave in p and equal to 0 for p = p e ; therefore, its slope is necessarily negative for p = p e , which violates (15). The argument is similar if the optimal deviation price p is above p e . Lastly, since both the left-hand sides of (14) and (15) are convex in p e , the set of prices satisfying both constraints is an interval. Definingp
we can now prove Proposition 3.1. First, by definition ofp F , we have Π F ≤ Π p F +v (ε)−k. Moreover, since the strategy described in the above lemma generates a FSE, we have
which is possible only ifp F is played with probability one at all dates. Furthermore, p e =p F satisfies (14) and (15) with Π F = Π p F + v (ε) − k, and thus also satisfies (5) and (6). The conclusion p F = p F follows from the fact that, conversely, any price satisfying (5) and (6) belongs to I F . To see that, it suffices to note that (5) and (6) imply (the argument is similar to that given above for the equivalence of (16) with (14) and (15))
which in turn implies that adopting the strategy "charge the expected price p e as long as the realized prices belong to [p e −ε/2, p e +ε/2] 2 , and play s F otherwise" constitutes an equilibrium.
B Proof of proposition 4
Let Π F 0 (δ) be the maximal profit that can be sustained assuming that Π F = 0, and denote by s F 0 (δ) and p F 0 (δ) the corresponding strategy and collusive expected price. For any given δ, p F 0 (δ) is at least as high as the price that can be supported by a reversal to Nash, which itself is strictly above p N for δ > 0.
Choose p such that
• The price p increases with k and goes up to p N as k increases up to Π p N + v (ε).
• For anyδ there existsk such that, for any δ ≥δ and k ∈ k , Π p N + v (ε) the price p characterized by (18) is well-defined and satisfies:
To show that Π F = 0, we use the following punishment path: 2 ) are themselves punished by returning to the beginning of the punishment path, we now show that no such deviations are profitable. As usual, it suffices to consider one-period deviations and, moreover, since by construction deviations are ruled out in periods t > T , we restrict attention to the first T + 1 periods.
By sticking to the above strategy, in each period τ < T, a manufacturer's expected profit is given by in contradiction with (18). A similar argument holds if the optimal deviation price p is above p.
Lastly, note that (18) and (19) imply that p satisfies both (14) and (15) (with Π F = 0), and thus belongs to I F . Therefore,p ∈ p, p F 0 (δ) also belongs to I F and, from the proof of Proof of Proposition 3.1, there is no profitable deviation from the punishment path in period T .
C Proof of proposition 4
The same argument as before can be used to show that, along the equilibrium path generated by the best collusive strategys, the same price is charged in each period. Since Π = Π F , the equilibrium path is thus either of the form "charge an expected price p F without RP M in each period", which yields
We will use the following lemma: Fixε and, for any price
and
Then, if max p N <p<p M φ (p) > 0, there exists a range of values of the discount factor for which RP M is necessarily used along the equilibrium path of the best collusive FSE.
We first show that if φ (p) > 0 for a price p ∈ p N , p M , then RP M is necessarily used along the equilibrium path of the best collusive FSE when δ = δ (p). Note first that for δ = δ (p), p F ≤ p since by construction (6) is binding at p. Second, (23) and φ (p) > 0 imply (using ∆(p) − Π(p) = (
and thus q (p) satisfies (7). Therefore, a price slightly above q (p) is feasible with RP M and more profitable than p (and thus p F ) 25 without RP M . To complete the proof, it suffices to note that δ (p) is increasing in p. Therefore, whenever max p N <p<p M φ (p) > 0, there exists a range of values p for which φ (p) > 0 (φ is concave, so that this range is actually an interval) and, therefore, a range of values of the discount factor for which RP M is necessarily used along the best collusive equilibrium path.
It is straightforward to check that the function φ (p) is concave and reaches its maximum for p characterized by the first-order condition:
We now show that whenε/d is small enough, the price p ∈ p N , p M defined by (24) satisfies φ (p) > 0. Defining η =ε/d and x, y, λ and µ by
conditions (21) and (24) become
Conditions (25) and (26) define x and y as a function of η, and, combined together, yield
Since the right-hand side of this equation is a decreasing function of y for y > 0 and equals 0 for y = 1, there is a one-to-one relationship between η 25 We already show that p F ≤ p, which is sufficient to conclude; the fact that (7) is satisfied at q (p) however implies that the weaker constraint (5) is also satisfied at q (p) and thus at p < q (p). Therefore, p F = p.
and y, and y tends to 1 as η tends to 0. Condition (25) then also implies that x tends to 1 as η gets to 0 and, moreover, the first-order approximation yields, for η small:
Finally, for x and y satisfying (25) and (26), φ (p) can be written as
Therefore, for η =ε/d small enough, there exist x and y, solution to (25) and (26), which satisfy 0 < x < y < 1 and for which φ > 0.
The final point is to show that the analysis is compatible with the assumption Π F = 0. To see this, notice that the interval of prices p such that φ(p) > 0 is independent of δ and k. Let us fix all parameters except these two and choose a price p in the relevant interval. Then (23) defines an increasing relationship between k and δ. As k converges to Π(p N ) + v (ε), δ converges to some positive limit. Chooseδ strictly smaller than this limit, and letk be the corresponding fixed cost defined in proposition (4) . Then for k high enough, δ defined by (23) is larger thanδ while k >k. Thus Π F = 0 and RP M is used in equilibrium.
D Proof of Proposition 5
As before let Π F 0 (δ) be the maximal profit that could be sustained if Π F = 0. Whenε/d is small enough, there exists p and p such that p < p < p N and
Consider the following system:
Equation (29) defines p as an increasing function of p with p = p N at p = p N and dp d p
Equation (30) defines in turn p as a function ofε, with value p N at ε = 0 and
Choose thenε small 26 and p and p defined by (29) and (30). Then
Suppose now thatε/d is indeed "small", and fix δ and k such that, for p and p defined as in the above lemma,
Consider first the case without RP M and suppose that Π F = 0. Then the maximal profit is Π
and thus p / ∈ I F . Therefore, all prices in I F are closer to p N than p and thus generate a strictly positive profit.
27 This implies
We now turn to the case where RP M is allowed and consider the following equilibrium: play p with RP M for one period, then play s F ; start again if a deviation occurs. The profit is (1 − δ) Π(p) − k + δΠ 
E Nonlinear tariffs and retailers' arbitrage
We now assume that there are n locations k = 1, ..., n, in which each producer i = 1, 2 has a single retailer facing a local shock ε ik on demand. The framework is the same as in the core model, except that: i) each producer i can offer each retailer k a menu of nonlinear tariffs T ik ; ii) retailers can coordinate on quantity exchanges, transfers and retail prices so as to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity offered by wholesale tariffs; iii) there is a common shock on the demand faced by all retailers of a given product. The demand of a retailer is then
where d i and ε ik are independent, with respective means d and 0 (ε ik and ε ik can be correlated). For the sake of tractability, we will assume that all retailers of a same producer i share the information regarding the local shocks ε i = (ε ik ) k=1,...,n when deciding on inter-retailer trade and prices, but none of them observes the aggregate shock d i at this stage. 28 Then,
27 By construction, Π( p) + v(ε) − k = 0; the conclusion follows from the fact that Π (p) is quadratic and reaches its peak for a price p higher than p N . 28 The reason for introducing an aggregate shock on demand is to limit the information contained in quantities, see below.
given the menus T ik and the stochastic distribution of the rival's retail prices (p jk ) k=1,...,n , where each price p jk a priori depends on the realization of all shocks ε j ≡ (ε jh ) h=1,...,n , each retailer will select a tariff t ik , a price p ik and an internal quantity transfer 29 δ ik solution to: It is useful to first characterize the distribution of retail prices, (p ik ) k=1,...,n , for a given total "expected quantity" Q i = kq ik ; those prices are solution to: 29 Each retailer k can transfer a quantityδ ikk to any other retailer k of the same producer i; however, only the overall transfer δ ik = Σ k δ ikk matters for our purpose. Note that we do not allow retailers of one product to make quantity transfers contingent on the other retailers' ex post price, in order to avoid introducing interbrand links in the contractual relations.
or f (ε i ) = − When local shocks are independently and identically distributed, this minimal variance increases with the number or retailers n and boils down in the limit (n very large) to V ar [ε ik ] /4, the variance generated by two-part tariffs.
Remark: Information contained in quantities
In the case of a single market, observing the quantity sold is uninformative since all the information is already contained in the two retail prices. In contrast, in a multi-market context where only a few prices are observed, quantities may convey useful information. However in the presence of expost aggregate demand shocks, this information is not sufficient to detect deviations for sure, even with a very large number of markets. To see this, assume that a manufacturer observes all of its retailers' prices and the quantity bought by each of them, but not the rival's retail prices. Given the contracts offered, manufacturer i can compute the retailers' pricing policy p ik (ε i ) =p ik (ε i ) + ε ik /2. Observing all prices p ik , the manufacturer can infer ex-postε i (since Σ k p ik (ε i ) only depends onε i ) and thus all individual shocks ε ik . Therefore its retailers' prices fully inform the manufacturer about its own retailers' information. We now show that it however provides only an imperfect information about the rival's prices.
The demand eventually addressed by retailer ik to manufacturer i is
where p ik is observed, and both ε ik and δ ik can be inferred, by the manufacturer. Therefore, observing both its retailers' prices and quantities informs manufacturer i on
Building on the above analysis, the retail prices p jk will take the form:
p jk =p j (ε j ) + ε jk 2 wherep j (ε j ) depends on the contracts offered by the rival. Therefore, the only relevant information concerning the opponents actions contained in d i + σp jk is aboutp j (ε j ), and the maximal useful information is thus contained in the mean:
Since d i is independent fromε j , this is only a garbled information on the opponents pricing strategy.
